Howdy UFOs,
It’s been awhile since I’ve talked about audits and aliens. I would like to present some findings which may corroborate specific claims made in the legendary Wilson/Davis memo, namely in identifying the audit which nearly outed the program, according to Admiral Thomas Wilson. I will begin with a brief passage of relevant points within the memo, and will provide further information that may tie up a few loose threads, and wrap up with a brief timeline of events. As always, I am happy to answer the community’s questions and will provide a link to the good questions at the bottom of this post.
I've also left a brief conclusion/TLDR at the bottom for the folks who can't bother reading all of the details...
Wilson/Davis Memo recap
full notes link:
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6185702-Eric-Davis-meeting-with-Adm-Wilson
(Prior context: Adm. Thomas Wilson (TW) is recounting to Eric Davis (EWD) how he discovered a UFO program within OUSDAT records and him reaching out to said-program.)
TW: Yes, ten days later (mid-June or so). Flew out there
- Met in their conference room in their secure vault
- Three of them show up
EWD: Three guys with whom you had telecon?
TW: Yes, same 3
- Security director (NSA-retired, a CI expert)
- Program director
- Corporate attorney
- Called themselves “the watch committee,” or gate keepers.
EWD: What that phrase or name?
TW: I asked; they said they were formed out of necessity to protect themselves after a near disaster in the past almost blew their cover - something to do with an agreement that was reached with a couple of Pentagon SESs overseeing SAPs in those days - were vague about when that was.
EWD: What was this?
TW: Let me finish!
- They said years ago in past an audit investigation led to them, and it wasn’t supposed to- nearly outed!
- A battle, a nasty back n’ forth between them and the investigator and his Pentagon chief ensued - like a tug of war for program transparency, they told me- money was the issue- their hiding out became the other issue! - Some kind of threat was leveled to blow the lid off them so they backed down and let the investigator in to complete his job
- (They work very hard to keep program hidden)
EWD: What happened with that?
TW: He was officially briefed, given tour, shown their program
EWD: Did they show him a craft? Or hardware they said was “alien” or from a UFO?
TW: Didn’t say more about that.
- Said after that episode a formal agreement was struck with Pentagon people (SAPOC) to prevent this in future - didn’t want a repeat.
- Special criteria were established in agreement
- A special circumstance that must meet rigorous access criteria set by contractor committee
- No USG personnel are to gain access unless they met the criteria - to be administered by contractor committee (program director, attorney, security director) irregardless of the tickets and position USG personnel possessed.
- Literally their way or the highway
Helpful context: Eric’s detailed notes indicate that Admiral Thomas Wilson had this exchange with “the watch committee” around May 1997.
GAO Audits of the DoD
The Government Accountability Office, or GAO, is an independent government agency within the legislative branch that provides auditing, evaluative, and investigative services for the United States Congress. When instructed, the GAO has the capacity and legal authority to investigate any federal government agency and report relevant findings to the appropriate Congressional committees. ***You may have seen this office (w / r/ t UFOs) in passing, as there is a recent amendment to the
IAA for 2025
which requires a GAO Comptroller General review of the All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office (AARO), namely its UAP reporting and Federal agency coordination efforts.
The GAO isn’t the only office with purview over DoD audits, and general monetary audits are usually performed by the Inspectors General of each agency, sometimes with the assistance of public accounting firms. However, if Congress asks any questions about DoD spending or programs, they often call upon the GAO to get it done, sometimes in the form of an amendment to the annual spending bill. With that in mind, and also keeping in mind the context of the Wilson/Davis memo, let’s take a look at a pretty scathing report of DoD Special Access Programs, which was completed and reported to Congress just a few years before Thomas Wilson would meet with the “gatekeepers”.
DoD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided When Access Is Denied or Revoked, published May 1993
~https://www.gao.gov/assets/nsiad-93-162.pdf~
The full report is 38 pages, but I will summarize key findings, quotes, and major takeaways:
- The GAO “review(ed) the due process procedures and practices for individuals whose access to Special Access Programs (SAPs) and sensitive compartmented information (SCI) in the Army, Navy, and Air Force is denied or revoked.”
- Report was requested by:
- William Clay (D), Chairman, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
- Frank McCloskey (D), Chairman, Subcommittee on the Civil Service, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service
- Don Edwards (D), Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary
Key Quote on due process: “When unfavorable information surfaces or actions occur that indicate that authorizing or continuing an individual’s access to a SAP or SCI is not clearly consistent with the interest of national security, the access may be denied or revoked. When this happens, the individual should generally receive administrative due process, which includes being notified of the reasons, given a chance to respond, and advised of any appeal procedures. The nature and extent of due process depends on whether there is a security clearance, SAP access, or SCI access and whether the individual is a government or contractor employee.”
- “DoD procedures for security clearance and SAP/SCI access denials and revocations for government personnel provide that the individual be told in writing that denial or revocation is being considered, including the reasons; given an opportunity to respond in writing; given a written response with the reasons for the final administrative action; and given an opportunity to appeal the decision to a higher authority within the service or component.”
- “The Director of Central Intelligence (present-day Director of National Intelligence) has established minimum appeal procedures for individuals whom access to SCI has been denied or revoked. The SCI due process procedures are not as extensive as DoD’s. For example, the individual can request the reasons for denial or revocation of SCI access, but there is no requirement that the reasons be provided.”
- “With respect to DoD military and civilian personnel in SAPs, the Navy and Air Force did not comply with DoD Regulations, which generally requires due process when access to a SAP is denied or revoked.”
- In responding to this apparent noncompliance by the Navy and Air Force, DoD officials said the regulation was not intended to cover covert or unacknowledged SAPs. However, the regulation does not contain such qualification or limitation.
- The Navy and Air Force used the minimum procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence (ie. individuals were notified after the access had been denied or revoked).
- “The Navy and Air Force did not have appeal procedures for SAPs because they did not have administrative due process for these programs. The Army had SAP administrative due process, including appeals, which was similar to its SCI process.”
- “Some of the designated appeal officials of the Navy and Air Force were in the same commands as the officials who made the determinations that resulted in the appeals (ie. revoking SAP clearance).”
- “DoD officials told us that the regulation was not intended to cover covert or unacknowledged SAP or SCI programs; however, there is no mention in the regulation about this limitation. DoD officials said that in the case of SAPs involving DoD personnel, they used the due process procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence for SCI because of the program similarities.”
I call this next section, “fun with audit samples”
- “Because DoD does not maintain centralized records on SAP denials and revocations, we could only review the cases provided by the services, who told us that unacknowledged program cases would be excluded.”
- “The Navy gave us a listing of 70 SAP cases that covered the 9-month period beginning October 1, 1991, and we randomly selected 30.”
- “The Air Force gave us 26 SAP cases, and we reviewed them all. Most of the cases involved contractor personnel.”
- “DoD maintains a central records system that shows the security clearance and SCI eligibility status to DoD military, civilian, and contractor personnel. We used these records to select random samples of security clearance denials and revocations during our previous review, but we could only use them to select Army cases. We could not use them to select Navy and Air Force cases because of unreliable data partly resulting from the way the two services were organized to adjudicate security clearances and SCI accesses.”
- “The Army has a central adjudication facility to handle clearances and SCI access, whereas the Navy has one office handling clearances and two that handle SCI accesses. The Air Force, until recently, had two separate offices handling clearances and SCI accesses.”
Admiral Wilson also mentions how the unacknowledged UAP SAPs are in the same records group, but their relationship to each other is not obvious, which is weird based on his experience.
- "The central records showed that during the first 6 months of fiscal year 1992, there were 479 DoD and contractor employees for whom the Army denied or revoked SCI access. We selected our 30-case sample from that number. When we extracted random samples of Navy and Air Force cases from the central records and attempted to review the cases at the Navy and Air Force SCI adjudicating offices, we had some problems. The offices had many cases that did not appear in the central records. Therefore, we had to use listing of cases provided by the offices to select random samples of cases to review."
Did the GAO accidentally stumble across the UAP program due to the sampling approach used to review SCI cases? The next section might shed some more light.
Unacknowledged SAPs in the sample?
- “When we started our review, DoD was reluctant to give us SAP cases from unacknowledged programs because of security reasons. DoD told us that such programs accounted for about 10 to 20% of the total number of SAPs.”
- “We agreed to review access denials and revocations for only the presumably less sensitive acknowledged programs.”
Sure, it seems as if the sample sizes might not have accounted for revocations cases involving unacknowledged SAPs, but the way these are phrased possibly infers that an unacknowledged program was accidentally discovered during this particular audit. Was the SAP discovered during the concurrent review of SCI cases?
Director of Central Intelligence 1/14 for SCI
- Signed in May 1976 by George H.W. Bush, Director of Central Intelligence at the time.
- Sets minimum standards for notification that access to SAP or SCI has been denied or revoked, no provision for individual response to notification, however individuals are given the opportunity to appeal decisions.
- “Navy and Air Force, as permitted by DoD regulation, used minimum procedures established by the DCI. Individuals were notified after the access had been denied or revoked.”
GAO Recommendations to DoD
- Direct Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force to comply with the due process requirements of DoD’s personnel security program regulation with respect to military and civilian personnel for whom access to a SAP is denied or revoked;
- Require that the services designate officials for appeal purposes from commands that are independent from those officials who make unfavorable SAP/SCI access determinations;
- Establish oversight procedures to ensure compliance by the services and components with the SAP/SCI due process requirements for DoD and contractor personnel;
- Propose that the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) establish SAP due process procedures for contractor employees that are similar to DoD’s procedures for its military and civilian personnel.
DoD’s Response to GAO Recommendations
- DoD generally did not agree with our findings and recommendations, although it agreed with several issues.
- Basic differences exist with respect to the interpretation of requirements of DoD regulations (over SAP/SCI administrative due process procedures), DoD’s practical definition of due process, and results of our review and accompanying recommendations.
- “DoD did not concur with our recommendation calling for Navy and Air Force compliance with the administrative due process requirements. DoD said that we incorrectly took the position that its regulation requires the same administrative due process to deny or revoke an individual’s clearance for access to SAPs, regardless of the sensitivity of the program information.”
If the GAO only looked at acknowledged SAP cases, why is the DoD defending their rationale for cases involving “sensitive” (unacknowledged) programs?
Creation of the Senior Review Group (SRG) supporting SAPOC
Following the public release of the report in May 1993, DoD officials worked to revamp their protocols for SAPs and SCI. Notably, the SAPOC (Special Access Program Oversight Committee) modified its process for validating SAPs and reviewing security protocols. On January 5, 1994, the DEPSECDEF (Deputy Secretary for Defense) announced the creation of a Senior Review Group, which would review all SAPs before they were presented to the SAPOC.
Click here for that document.
This is the same Senior Review Group that intimidated Admiral Wilson after he discovered a SAP dealing with UAP. Direct quotes from Wilson/Davis memo below:
EWD: Did you complain to SAPOC?
TW: Yes - called the subgroup members (Senior Review Group members) to a meeting at Pentagon
- Told them what happened at meeting
- They responded that they would sustain the contractor on their access denial
- So I ended up arguing with them a while
- Broke up in 20 minutes and they would meet me in 2-3 days.
- Got the call 2 days later (near end of June) and met again with Senior Review Group members
EWD: When?
TW: Before last week of June (97’)
- They told me (TW) that they were sustaining the contractor, that I was to immediately drop the matter and let it go - forget about it as I did not have purview over their project, it didn’t fall within my oversight, etc.
- I became very angry - started yelling when should have kept my mouth shut
EWD: Miller and Greer said you nearly got busted.
TW: Close to that!
- Told Miller Senior Review Group chairman said if I didn’t follow their suggestion that I would not see Director DIA promotion, got early retirement, lose 1 or 2 stars along the way
- Really incredibly angry - upset over this - livid!!!
- Why such a big deal over this considering the position of trust I have in the Pentagon - I do have relevant regulatory/statutory authority over their program - that’s my position!!!
Chronological Timeline of Events Described Above
February 1993-April 1993: GAO reviews SAP and SCI administrative due process protocols for Army, Navy, and Air Force. GAO finds limited evidence that Army follows DoD regulations, but seriously questions due process protocols for SAPs/SCI for Navy and Air Force.
April 1993: DoD responds to draft GAO report, indicates due process is not required for sensitive/unacknowledged programs. Agrees with several issues, but does not concur with GAO’s underlying assessment or definitions.
May 1993: GAO report forwarded to Congress. DoD begins addressing recommendations.
January 1994: DEPSECDEF announces creation of SRG to review all SAPs prior to transmission to SAPOC.
July 1994: While directly unrelated to this narrative, the
Air Force publishes the “Roswell Report” after a lengthy
GAO records inspection for documents “on the 1947 weather balloon crash at Roswell Army Air Field, New Mexico, focusing on the requirements for reporting air accidents similar to the Roswell crash; and any government records concerning the Roswell crash.
(Anyone find the scope of this investigation curious?)
May 1997: Admiral Thomas Wilson discovers a series of unacknowledged SAPs under his authority and demands read-in to the program.
mid-June 1997: Admiral Wilson is told by “the watch committee”, a group of three corporate officials, that their program is reverse engineering a vehicle “not from this earth - not made by human hands.” The gatekeepers are extremely testy with Wilson’s lines of questioning.
late-June 1997: Admiral Wilson then meets with the SRG overseeing the portfolio and is told to drop his inquiries. Warned he will lose his promotion chances, forced into early retirement, or worse.
October 2002: Eric Davis meets with Admiral Wilson to discuss his discovery of an unacknowledged SAP dealing with a UAP vehicle in the possession of a "top aerospace defense contractor with intelligence in their portfolio."
Conclusion
Based on the details provided within the Wilson/Davis memo, I have reasonable confidence that
this GAO audit-in-question is the audit referenced within the memo, which almost inadvertently outed the UAP Program.
The GAO’s review focused on the larger concept known as due process, which is a fundamental right afforded to all Americans under the US Constitution. The GAO believes that due process should be afforded to all individuals, including those working in SAPs or working with SCI. However, the DoD (mainly the Air Force and Navy) disagreed with this notion, stating that due process is not required for cases involving unacknowledged or extremely-sensitive programs, among other reasons. The DoD were required to address the recommendations of the report, which likely led to the creation of the Senior Review Group that assists the SAPOC, the same SRG which intimidated Admiral Wilson after he discovered a UAP program.